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Chapter 1
Overview: Developments in Risk
Management for Retirement Security
Olivia S. Mitchell and Kent Smetters

This volume evaluates advances in retirement risk management by exploring
developments that hold out new promise for enhancing old-age income
security. Recent volatility in capital markets, along with longer-term trends in
pension system design, has prompted questions about how well the evolving
retirement system is performing. These issues are taking on additional force
as massive global demographic change is producing the largest group of
retirees in human history. Such economic and demographic challenges
prompt policymakers, academics, financial practitioners, and pension participants young and old, to search for innovative and creative responses to
what promises to be a more risky global retirement environment than in the
past.
Over the years, employers and governments around the world have tried
to protect against retirement insecurity by setting up defined benefit (DB)
pension schemes. Under such plans, retirement benefits depend on service
and salary, and benefits are usually paid as a lifelong annuity to long-term
employees who worked until retirement age. Yet as we show below, the traditional DB model has increasingly been supplanted with defined contribution
(DC) plans in many countries. In the case of a DC plan, retirement saving
tends to be more subject to employee control throughout the life cycle.
For example, DC participants can often decide whether and how much to
contribute to the plan, as well as where to invest the plan assets during the
accumulation phase. Additionally, at retirement, DC plan assets can frequently be taken in a lump-sum form, rather than automatically converted
to lifelong annuities.
Converting from DB to DC plans, offers participants several advantages.
On the accumulation side, workers gain more control over their retirement
saving decisions, which may spur more attention to individual decisionmaking and responsibility. Members may also be better protected from
the political risks that plague public pay-as-you-go retirement schemes.1
Nevertheless, workers and retirees also take on new types of risk in DC
plans. For instance, some people might save too little, or make poor investment choices, or have their portfolios eroded through administrative fees.
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In addition, participants bear uncertainty associated with investment returns
and over how long they will live in retirement.
There is surely no uniquely perfect retirement system design that will
apply to all countries for all economic circumstances, but there are just
as surely lessons to be learned about how to make pensions more resilient. This volume provides a range of new perspectives on how to better
manage the wide range of retirement risks as capital and labor markets
continue to evolve. In particular, with the market downturn and several
highly-publicized corporate collapses, policymakers and plan members have
begun to find appealing the idea of adding additional structure to both DC
and DB plans---structure that would help protect plan participants against
a range of risks. Below, we offer a brief analysis of why traditional defined
benefit pension plan appears to be abandoned in favor of defined contribution plans. We also discuss some key risks that both defined contribution and
defined benefit plans convey upon plan members, and we highlight some of
the ways recommended by contributors to this volume, for managing these
retirement risks.

Trends from Defined Benefit to Defined
Contribution Plans
Conventional DB retirement plans pay retirement benefits based on a prespecified formula set by the plan sponsor, which can be a government, an
employer, or some other entity. For example, in the United States, a private
sector DB plan might pay a retirement benefit equal to 2 percent of the
worker’s average wage during the last 5 years of work multiplied by his years
of employment. A 30-year worker with earnings averaging $50,000 per year
over the last 5 years before retirement could anticipate a yearly retirement
annuity of $30,000 (= 0.02 × $50, 000 × 30). This worker would therefore
receive a ‘‘replacement rate,’’ which is the pension benefit relative to his
final pay, of 60 percent. In most DB plans the retiree continues receiving
this benefit until he dies; some plans might pay some benefit to a surviving
spouse, as well. The DB approach is also prevalent in global public pension systems: almost 170 nations have national social security retirement
programs, many of which are based on the DB framework. In some cases,
benefit payments are structured as a simple percent of final pay, while in others, more elaborate formulas are used that include redistributive features as
well as survivors’ benefits.
An important historical appeal of the DB model was that it allowed
workers to plan for retirement without requiring much knowledge about
saving rates, portfolio choice, capital market risk, or mortality trends.
In particular, as long as the plan sponsor can pay the benefits, the retirement
payout is unrelated to the sponsoring firm’s stock value or to the investment performance of pension reserves. Furthermore, pension legislation
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in many countries requires plan sponsors to make good on these promises even if the underlying value of the pension reserve suddenly decreases.
In the United States, for instance, by law pension benefits must be paid even
if the value of the pension pools falls; consequently, corporate stockholders
are seen to bear pension investment risk, rather than DB plan participants.
Moreover, since DB plans typically have paid out life annuities, the plan
sponsor bears mortality risk as well.2
The past two decades have seen a rather pronounced movement away
from the DB and toward a DC model. Under the DC approach, a worker
contributes directly to his own retirement account that is then invested into
a financial portfolio. The retirement benefit is then directly related to his
own contributions (plus the sponsor’s, if any), as well as investment income
earned over time. Figure 1-1 shows that the number of DB plans declined
over time in the United States, while DC plans have grown dramatically,
particularly the very popular 401(k) plans. In 1975, assets held in DC plans
comprised 29 percent of all pension assets (including Individual Retirement
Account funds), and the DC share has grown to 72 percent by 2001 (Poterba
et al., 2001). During that same period, more than two dozen countries, spanning five continents, reformed their national retirement systems to include
DC individual accounts (see Table 1-1). In most of these cases, participants
exert some control over how their money is invested (subject to some constraints), and they receive the risk and reward for those investments. In yet
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Figure 1-1. Trends in US Private Sector Pension Plans (number of plans by type).
Source: Authors’ computations from data provided by the US Department of Labor,
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration. <www.dol.gov>.
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TABLE 1-1 Global Developments in Personal Account Retirement Systems

AQ: Pl.
update

Country

Year Personal
Accounts
Introduced

Chile

1981

Switzerland
UK
Denmark
Australia
Colombia

1985
1986
1990
1992
1993

Peru
Argentina
China
Uruguay

1993
1994
1995
1996

Bolivia
Mexico
El Salvador

1997
1997
1998

Hungary
Kazakhstan
Sweden

1998
1998
1998

Costa Rica
Poland
Hong Kong
Nicaragua
Dominican Republic
Croatia

1999
1999
2000
2000
2001
2002

Voluntary Participation Choice?

New workers must join new system;
current workers may choose between
systems
No
Yes
No
No
Yes, workers are allowed to switch back
and forth every 3 years
Yes
Yes
No
Employees >40 years can choose; those
<40 years and new workers must join
new system
No
No
All new and young workers must
join new system. Older workers must
remain with old system. Workers age
36--55 (men)/50 (women) may choose
No
No
Workers born before 1938 stay in old
system; those born after 1953 in new
system; gradual transition from old to
new system for others
Yes
No

Yes

Source: Smetters and Park (in progress).

other cases such as Singapore, Provident Funds have been established into
which workers contribute; here participants are allocated a fixed return,
akin to so-called ‘‘cash balance’’ plans.
While the movement toward DC plans seems to be a global phenomenon,
we believe that somewhat different factors explain the DB to DC shift in the
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private versus the public sector. Specifically, we shall argue that the private
sector change mainly reflects labor market dynamics, whereas the changes
experienced in national retirement systems tend to be more reflective of
demographic and political risks.

Challenges to Private Sector Pensions
Traditionally private sector DB pensions have had an important role in
attracting and retaining workers (Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999). One way
they do this is by offering additional lifetime compensation for those workers
who remain with their employers for life (Clark and McDermed, 1990). In
exchange for this positive aspect of DB plans, however, many also build in a
‘‘job-lock effect,’’ discouraging workers from leaving their jobs early in their
careers.3
The way job-lock works may be illustrated with a simple example.
Suppose that a new employee, call her Jane, works for the same firm for
3 years, and she earns $30,000 in the first year, $40,000 in the second year,
and $50,000 in the third year. We further suppose that the company’s DB formula specifies a yearly retirement benefit equal to one-quarter of the wage
earned in Jane’s last year of employment times the number of years she
worked with the firm. At retirement, the employee would then be entitled
to a benefit equal to $37,500 (= 41 × $50, 000 × 3). Now alternatively, suppose that Jane earned the same annual salary each year, but instead she
changed firms annually, working at three different companies, each having the same retirement formula. In this second case, when Jane retires,
she will be entitled to a benefit from the first company equal to $7,500
(= 41 ×$30, 000×1), plus $10,000 from the second firm (= 41 ×$40, 000×1),
plus a benefit of $12,500 from the third company (= 41 × $50, 000 × 1).
The total benefit in the second case would total $30,000, or $7,500 less than
if she had remained with the first firm the entire time. Consequently the
retirement formula provides a clear incentive to stay with the same employer,
even if the worker’s skills become more valuable with another company.
This hypothetical worker’s benefit entitlement would have been even
lower had she failed to ‘‘vest’’ before changing jobs. Vesting refers to the
point at which a worker gains a legal right to an eventual retirement benefit. In the United States, vesting rarely occurred before 10 years of service
until recently, but legal changes now require vesting in private pensions
within 3 years of coverage (Sass, 1997). In any event, groups with higher job
turnover rates, such as women, are much more prone than men to fail to
vest under DB plans. This potential inefficiency has become particularly key
as more women entered the labor force over the past two decades. Hence
one motivation for the movement from DB to DC plans is to reduce this
labor market distortion.4
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To be sure, some ‘‘job-lock’’ might be efficient, especially in industries
that require a fair amount of on-the-job training: employers can use joblock to recapture some of their training investment. But fewer industries
today are characterized by extensive on-the-job training; moreover, other
mechanisms (such as deferred stock options) have been devised to provide
incentive-based deferred compensation. As a result, DC plans are seen as
more compatible with a mobile workforce in that they offer more portability:
employees typically can roll over their accounts on changing employers,
which undoes the job-lock problem quite readily.5
Another rationale for the shift on pension offerings notes that employers
in many developed countries have begun to face tight labor markets in particular skill areas along with global product--market competition (Lofgren et
al., 2001; Mitchell et al., forthcoming). The combination suggests that compensation packages must be more flexibly designed so as to accommodate
the diverse needs of a more heterogeneous and less rapidly growing workforce. For example, a DC plan typically offers employees more control over
how much to contribute, how their money is invested, and how to withdraw
it, as compared to traditional DB plans.6 In addition, DC plans are more
flexible in terms of retirement age, unlike DB plans that generally subsidize
early retirement but penalize continued work at older ages.7 Both factors
suggest that DC plans are more likely to grow more popular in the private
sector, in the future.

Challenges to Public Sector Pensions

AQ: Pls.
update the
ref.

Pension plans in the public sector have also undergone substantial change
in the last two decades. Traditionally, national social security systems were
of the DB variety, mostly operated on a pay-as-you-go basis. Operating them
on an unfunded basis means that participants are exposed to fluctuations in
annual tax revenues, inasmuch as current revenues are needed to pay benefits each year. Consequently, workers find themselves exposed to the risk that
shortfalls will require raising taxes, and retirees in traditional DB systems
worry about unexpected costs and possible benefit cuts due to demographic
changes and political uncertainty.
Appreciation of these risks over the last two decades prompted many countries to follow in Chile’s footsteps, after that nation adopted a DC structure
in 1981 for its national retirement system (Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt,
1999). Many developing countries appear to have followed suit in response
to situations of crisis and breakdown in their national programs; very few set
aside adequate public pension reserves for their national old-age systems.8
In developed countries, DC partial or full conversions appear to have been
motivated by forecasts of future demographic change and long-run cost
concerns (Smetters and Park, in progress).
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Plan Design and Investment Risk
Adopting a DC plan affords workers and retirees additional, and sometimes
welcome, control over their retirement saving and income. On the other
hand, this added flexibility also brings new risks, some of which workers and
retirees appear relatively ill-equipped to handle. In this section we discuss
ways in which plan sponsors transfer retirement system risks to participants,
and how this risk transfer can be better handled by good plan design.
The main source of risk we focus on here is investment risk, which is key
since the value of DC accounts at retirement depends on the worker’s and
sponsor’s contributions, as well as the investment returns earned over the
working lifetime.9 In the case of private sector conversion from DB to a
DC plan, the risk is transferred directly from shareholders to workers. In
the case of national social security DB to DC conversions, the nature of the
risk transfer likely depends on what happened to promises made under the
traditional system and how those promises were spread between pensioners
and taxpayers. New risks faced by workers under national DC plans might
actually be less than risks borne under unfunded old system, though DC
investment risks may seem more transparent to workers.
It is essential to note that investment risk is unavoidable when attempting
to advance-fund future retirement consumption, irrespective of whether
a pension system is based on the defined-benefit model or the definedcontribution model. While those who oppose augmenting social security
systems with personal saving accounts often point to investment risk as a
reason to oppose them, they miss an important point: true advance funding
of future pension liabilities always requires an increase in capital holdings,
and the risk associated with capital assets must be borne by someone. In a
DB model, this risk tends to be passed on to future social security taxpayers
in the form of risky tax rates, or to beneficiaries in the form of risky benefits.
In a pure DC model, this risk is borne by beneficiaries and so it must be
managed.
Although investors sometimes think that investment risk becomes less
important over the long run, most experts know that this position is not
accurate (e.g. Bodie, 1995; Chapter 2, this volume). Indeed, there have
been 15 years in the twentieth century alone in which the real value of
the US stock market fell over 40 percent in the succeeding decade.10 The
stock market declined by about 50 percent in real terms, between 1973
and 1975, and it did not return to its pre-1973 level for almost a decade.
More recently, the US stock market has given up almost 5 years of growth
including the earnings during the fast-growth late 1990s. Even at prevailing
values, price-earnings ratios exceed their historic average, and a high priceearnings ratio may foretell yet another decline, following a ‘‘mean reversion’’
process outlined by various financial economists.11 Also, though US capital
markets have performed well over the last century, the same has not been
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true for major foreign markets, which returned an average real return of
1.5 percent over the century (Goetzmann and Jorion, 1996).
One important lesson from the literature is that DC plan participants
must have access to high-quality, trustworthy investment advice, as well as
financial education so they can accurately assess the risk/return mix in
their pension plans. A survey conducted of the TIAA-CREF participant
pool suggest that most people in that sector appear to follow the standard rules for investing (Bodie and Crane, 1997).12 On the other hand the
group surveyed was better educated and more highly paid than on average, so questions remain about whether employees more generally would
follow this tactic. A different approach is to ask whether employees tend
to receive good advice from financial service firms and investment advisory services. Bodie (Chapter 2, this volume) reviews a number of advice
provider websites, and he concludes that a great deal of the information provided is logically flawed and sometimes even counterproductive.
For example, he illustrates that the standard advice proffered is tilted toward
risky investments, and it also offers little advice about protection against market declines. He concludes that more easy-to-understand advice and safer
investment products are needed to simplify the complex task of investing
for retirement.
Concern that DC participants might hold unbalanced investment portfolios in retirement plans is the focus of two studies that examine the role of
employer stock. This issue has become especially important following the
demise of Enron and other large employers. Mitchell and Utkus (Chapter 3,
this volume) explore why many DC plans became heavily concentrated in
company stock, the result of a policy conflict between wanting workers to
own the company and hence align their interests with the firm’s, versus
the more traditional need to hold a diversified retirement portfolio. One
striking finding is that 401(k) plan participants tend to believe that their
own firm’s company stock is safer than other individual company stock, and
also safer than a stock market index. The authors assemble a wide range of
data on this topic and outline policy options for future plan design. In a
related chapter, Ramaswamy (Chapter 4, this volume) tackles the difficult
issue of measuring the level of plan diversification when a worker holds a
great deal of his DC pension assets in his employer’s stock. The diversification measure he develops computes how ‘‘close’’ the participant’s portfolio
is to the point on an efficient capital market frontier that would produce
the same expected return. Ramaswamy’s measure can be computed without
knowing the expected returns to all the pension assets, and he shows that
many common DC plan portfolios are so badly diversified that they would
require very costly insurance to hedge these underlying risks.
The risk of nondiversification must be distinguished from general investment risk that arises from fluctuations in market returns. A person who
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elects an undiversified portfolio might forego larger returns even when the
market returns as a whole does well. Research shows that peoples’ DC portfolio choices follow the ‘‘path of least resistance,’’ by passively opting for
the enrollment and investment options suggested by their employers (Choi
et al., forthcoming). Consequently, good plan design regarding automatic
enrollment, investment choice, and financial education can have a powerful
impact on influencing, saving, and portfolio choices. A similar point applies
to national social security retirement systems. In the Swedish DC pension
system, one-third of participants chose the ‘‘standard’’ fund in 2000, which
was the fund assigned to those who did not elect any fund (Weaver, 2001).
For this reason, the Commission to Strengthen Social Security (CSSS, 2001)
recommended that a standardized portfolio be offered for those who failed
to elect a particular investment mix.
Another reason that investment risk in the DC system is of concern is that
public and private pension systems may interact with each other, sometimes
in complex ways. For example, Australia has for many years had both a
national mandatory DC system and also a means-tested old-age benefit for
the poor. The concern is that retirees have substantial flexibility in their
pension investments and pension payouts, an interaction that opens the
possibility of strategic participant behavior. The potential for moral hazard in this circumstance is explored by Doyle and Piggott (Chapter 5, this
volume), who evaluate how participants perceive the cost versus the benefit
of having a minimum pension benefit assured, versus a flat-rate benefit paid
regardless of the value of assets in their personal account. They find that
inflation-protected products have lots of value.
A different reason investment risk can arise results from confusion
about how capital market risk should be assessed by pension policymakers.
For example, when President Clinton proposed to invest the US Social
Security surplus in the stock market, government scorekeepers ‘‘scored’’ this
plan using risky expected stock returns. The problem with this approach is
that it does not explicitly discount for market risk, and as Smetters (2002)
shows, this scoring method imposes a large actuarial unfunded liability on
future generations. A similar problem arises with state-level pension systems and, to a lesser extent, private pension plans, as illustrated by Gold
(Chapter 6, this volume). The author also goes an important step further
by pinpointing how actuarial standards can result in this costly bias. Concern over interference in valuing and investing pension assets has been
highlighted by Iglesias and Palacios (2000), who emphasize how political
factors may play an important role in reducing DB plan investment returns.
To protect against this, several developed nations have restructured pension
governance and investment options to limit the usage of pension monies for
social projects that often earn low (or negative) real rates of return.
Palacios (Chapter 7, this volume) examines a range of ‘‘best practices,’’ and
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he contends that additional transparency, better reporting, and competitive
market benchmarks can yield higher pension plan investment returns.

Global Developments in Retirement Risk Transfer
One approach to managing the investment risks that workers face in a
defined-contribution plan is to offer them some form of guarantee. A simple
approach would promise a participant contributing to a DC plan that he
would receive a minimum rate of return on his investments, or guarantee
that the DC account would be of a minimum size when the worker attains
retirement age. Lachance and Mitchell (Chapter 8, this volume) estimate
the actuarial cost of providing different types of DC plan guarantees, which
they estimate using arbitrage pricing techniques. Though pension guarantees have been previously analyzed, this chapter considers a wider range of
guarantee structures and builds on methodology pioneered by Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). This chapter confirms that many pension guarantees
can be quite expensive. In addition, the authors also show that some potentially attractive guarantees might be more affordable. In particular, a ‘‘real
principal’’ guarantee would return to a participant the real value of his contributions, a structure akin to that adopted in the new ‘‘Japanese 401(k)’’
plans (Clark and Mitchell, 2002). Since the guarantee is price indexed but
the larger economy grows in real terms, this financial promise could be
offered at fairly reasonable costs. On the other hand costs may be especially
large if the plan guarantees a rate of return promised under a former DB
social security system (Smetters, 2002).
DC plan guarantees are also offered in Germany, and are the subject of
an examination by Maurer and Schlag (Chapter 9, this volume). Under the
German Retirement Saving Act, supplemental DC pensions were created
to offset reductions in traditional DB state benefit promises. To qualify for a special tax status, providers of these supplemental DC products
must ensure the nominal value of workers’ investments at retirement.
The authors examine different ways in which providers can hedge such risks,
as well as their associated costs. Alternative guarantees in Canadian ‘‘segregated funds’’ are examined by Vetzal, Forsyth, and Windcliff (Chapter 10,
this volume). Here a guarantee is provided after a specified time, on the initial principal invested. These contracts include a reset provision that allows
investors to lock in gains, as the value of the mutual fund increases; other
features may also be included such as a death benefit paid off immediately
on the investor’s death. The authors describe hedging strategies that can be
used by firms offering these contracts. Using numerical models they conclude that segregated contracts are quite expensive to offer, but that some
of the risks can be reduced quite significantly using fairly simple active (or
dynamic) hedging strategies.
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Guarantees are quite prevalent in many pension plan systems around
the world. For example, Chile was the first country to convert its complex DB system to one based on personal accounts. The Chilean system
then guaranteed that each plan would yield a rate of return not too far
from the average return and it also ‘‘tops up’’ personal accounts on retirement, so as to ensure that individual accounts are large enough to finance a
benefit equal to approximately 75 percent of the minimum wage (Walliser,
Chapter 11, this volume). This guarantee produces a retirement benefit
equal to about 25 percent of the average wage in the economy (Diamond
and Vadés-Prieto, 1994). Walliser also surveys other mandatory retirement
systems and groups them into two general types, and he further discusses economic rationales for and incentives created by these guarantees.
Pension guarantees have also been offered in a wide range of voluntary
DC plans, as discussed by Turner and Rajnes (Chapter 12, this volume).
These authors demonstrate that guarantees typically differ from those
offered in mandatory system: that is, voluntary DC plans tend to offer a fixed
nominal rate of return, while relative rate of return guarantee tend to be
offered by mandatory plans. They argue that the more generous voluntary
system guarantees are more likely to encourage plan participation.
While many may find attractive the provision of guarantees in pension
plans, there remains the key issue of how to finance the costs of providing
different guarantees. These calculations are important because guarantees
sometimes seem to be ‘‘free’’; this is the case, for example, on government
budget balance sheets that only report contemporaneous flows of revenues
and costs, but ignore potential insurance liabilities down the road. Yet such
guarantees can represent considerable risk to future taxpayers or, in the case
of private sector, substantial risks for the party holding the short position of
these contracts.
One of the most important diversification strategies for pension systems is
to find investment vehicles whose returns are not highly correlated with the
performance of the rest of the economy. For example, a worker who loses
his or her job faces a second tragedy if the value of his pension plan also
sharply decreases in value. Cummins and Lewis (Chapter 13, this volume)
investigate a new class of derivative securities whose returns are tied to events
such as catastrophes and weather. They argue that these securities might be
quite useful to institutional investors, such as a mutual fund, because of the
low correlation of their returns with other financial investments. Moreover,
these securities pay a rate of return that is often much higher than other
low-correlation securities, such as government bonds. But Cummins and
Lewis argue that some caution is in order: these markets are quite thin, and
so this premium might reflect liquidity problems.
Additional issues pertinent to pension payouts are taken up in the study by
Fliegelman, Milevsky, and Robinson (Chapter 14, this volume). Their focus
is whether and how insurers will be able to ‘‘make good’’ on promises to pay
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lifelong annuities. To this end, they propose that insurers can do several
things, including offsetting mortality exposure via life insurance products
and sensible product design. For example, they indicate that restricting
investment options of plan participants can reduce volatility of returns and
hence the value of the option granted to the contract holder. In addition,
they recommend distributor and participant education as product complexity increases. Finally they explore alternative financing mechanisms
including reinsurance that might permit insurers to access product design
and mortality expertise of reinsurers, though they also note that reinsurers
have traditionally been less than willing to accept longevity risk unless it is
priced very conservatively.

Conclusions
Ultimately, retirement income products that offer new promise for old-age
income security must better handle the increased volatility resulting from
capital market investment, along with longer-term trends in pension system
design, that have prompted concerns regarding how effectively retirement
systems can perform. Policymakers, academics, financial practitioners, and
pension participants are engaged in an active search for innovative responses
to the emerging global retirement environment.
This research shows that the pension market is far from exhausted.
Indeed, more workers than ever before seek sensible pension designs to
help them save during the accumulation phase, and also to help them manage pension payouts in retirement. Maintaining insurer financial integrity
and profitability is essential, including protecting for the long-tailed nature
of payout annuity contracts. In addition, more work remains to be done on
how to better protect retiree minimum pension guarantees, ultimately the
core concern of retirement plan designers.
AQ:
Schieber
and Shoven
2000 is not
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Notes
1 For a discussion of political risk in the case of the US Social Security system see
Schieber and Shoven (2000) and Cogan and Mitchell (2002). Other countries are
discussed in World Bank (1994).
2 For a more extended discussion of US pension law and solvency issues the reader
is referred to McGill et al. (1996); for more on annuities see Brown et al. (2001).
3 Many analysts have examined labor market impacts of DB plans; for reviews see
Mitchell (1982) and Gustman et al. (1994).
4 DC plans did not technically replace existing DB plans in most cases; rather, existing
workers are often allowed to contribute to new DC plans, and new companies now
typically elect the DC form; for a review see Mitchell (2000).
5 Some DC firms do match a portion of employee contributions and then impose a
vesting period similar to that in DB plans, before the matched contributions become
the employee’s personal property. In this case, some job-lock still exists though it is
less important relative to traditional DB plans.
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6 The job-lock problem can also be addressed with a cash-balance DB plan
that promises a fixed rate of return on contributions. Nevertheless these plans
are costly to administer and typically do not give employees portfolio choice. Any
employee seeking a relatively predictable rate of return could, of course, obtain it
in a DC plan by investing in low-risk bonds.
7 Cash balance plans can also encourage continued work; see Clark and Schieber
(2000).
8 While a few have done so, as in the case of Asian Provident Funds, these assets are
often invested in fairly poor-performing assets. For a discussion of pension plans for
governmental employees see Mitchell and Hustead (2000).
9 For other risks we do not address here see Brown et al. (2000) and Bodie,
Hammond, and Mitchell (2002).
10 These include 1908--12, 1937, 1939, 1965--66 and 1968--73 (see Campbell and
Shiller, 1998).
11 Campbell and Shiller (1998) argue that the price--dividend ratio is a powerful
predictor of future prices, contrary to the efficient market hypothesis. On these
grounds, they forecast a 38 percent loss in the real value of stocks over the next
decade.
12 One important exception was that participants often failed to ‘‘tax minimize,’’
which means they did not figure out a contribution and asset mix that would reduce
lifetime taxes paid on retirement saving and dissaving.
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